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I. Introduction
This Note examines the unusual practice in which an administrative
agency "confesses error" in a legal challenge to an agency action. In
* Candidate for J.D., Washington and Lee University School of Law, May 2011.
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particular, it emphasizes the political ramifications of agency confessions of
error,' highlights the lack of a judicial standard for reviewing such
confessions, 2 and ultimately recommends an analytical framework that
courts should use in deciding whether to accept agency confessions of
error. 3
In general, a confession of error occurs when a government attorney
4
admits to a court that the government has committed a legal mistake. 5 A
government attorney, such as a prosecutor or the Solicitor General,
confesses error in order to "ensure the proper and fair administration of
justice.",6 For example, if a prosecutor learns that the state has improperly
convicted a criminal defendant, he may confess error on appeal and ask the
appellate court to vacate the conviction.7 In addition, a handful of times
each term, the Solicitor General confesses error before the Supreme Court,
arguing that the government should not have prevailed in the court below
and asking the justices to reverse the judgment.8
Although prosecutors and Solicitors General are the government
attorneys who most commonly confess error, other executive branch
officials also have occasion to use the practice. An administrative agency,
for instance, will sometimes confess error in litigation that challenges an
agency action such as a rulemaking.9 Agency confessions of error can
serve legitimate purposes, such as ending litigation that is no longer
contested and conserving agency and judicial resources; however, they may
also serve illegitimate purposes, such as when an agency uses a confession
1. See infra Part II (exploring the political ramifications of a confession of error
recently made by the Department of Interior).
2. See infra Part III (arguing that federal courts have not articulated a clear standard
for determining when to accept confessions of error made by administrative agencies).
3. See infra Part IW (proposing a comprehensive standard for courts to use when
deciding whether to accept an agency's confession of error).
4. See David M. Rosenzweig, Note, Confession of Error in the Supreme Court by the
Solicitor General, 82 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2117 (1994) ("Confession of error is a practice unique
to Government attorneys .. . .)
5. See id. at 2092-95 (describing various legal mistakes that may give rise to a
confession of error).
6. Id. at 2117.
7. See inf/ra Part 1II.C (reviewing prosecutorial confession of error).
8. See PETER N. UBERTACCIO 111, LEARNED IN THE LAW AND POLITICS: THE OFFICE OF
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND EXECUTIVE POWER 170-71 (2005) (reviewing the Solicitor
General's practice of confessing error).
9. See infra Part It (providing a detailed discussion of how the Department of Interior
attempted to confess error in litigation challenging an administrative rulemaking).
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of error as a strategic device to achieve a political goal.' 0 This Note
examines that distinction and explores how the risk of an improperly
motivated confession of error is especially acute in times of political
transition, such as during a change in presidential administrations.
Part 11 begins by introducing litigation concerning the Stream Buffer
Zone Rule (SBZ Rule)," which is an environmental regulation that protects
streams from the effects of coal mining. 12 This litigation arguably provides
an example of how an administrative agency can use confession of error as
a strategic tactic to achieve political goals-in this case, to circumvent the
procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.' 3 This Note
will use the controversy surrounding the SBZ Rule litigation as a vehicle to
explore the broader issue of agency confession of error and its attendant
political implications.
Because confessions of error can be subject to both legitimate uses and
illegitimate uses, the courts should have a clear, consistent, and coherent
standard of review for deciding whether to accept agency confessions of
error.'14  Unfortunately, no such standard has emerged.' 5  Part III of this
Note highlights and analyzes this shortcoming by reviewing how courts
have addressed agency confessions of error and by examining how the legal
scholarship has addressed confessions of error by other government
attorneys-namely Solicitors General and prosecutors. Part III illustrates
the current deficiencies of the confession of error jurisprudence. But it also
10. See infra Part V (critically examining a recent confession of error made by the
Department of Interior to determine whether it served a legitimate purpose or an illegitimate
purpose).
11. See Excess Spoil, Coal Mine Waste, and Buffers for Perennial and Intermittent
Streams, 73 Fed. Reg. 75,814 (Dec. 12, 2008) (identifying the circumstances under which
coal mining may be conducted near streams).
12. See, e.g., News Release, U.S. Office of Surface Mining, Office of Surface Mining
to Issue New Rule Tightening Restrictions on Excess Spoil, Coal Mine Waste, and Mining
Activities in or Near Streams (Dec. 3, 2008), available at http://www.osmre.gov/
resources/newsroonilNews/Archive/2008/120308.pdf [hereinafter OSM News Release]
(describing the SBZ rule as placing "restrictions on how coal mine operators can dispose of
coal mine waste and the excess spoil created by the mining operation").
13. See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) (mandating that administrative
agencies comply with certain procedural requirements before undertaking different types of
agency actions).
14. See infra Part III (arguing that a comprehensive standard for reviewing agency
confessions of error is needed).
15. See infra Part III (noting that no consistent standard has emerged for reviewing
confessions of error).
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suggests that in combination the existing jurisprudence and scholarship can
form the beginnings of a workable standard of judicial review.
Part IV of this Note develops a recommendation for such a standard by
synthesizing the research from Part III and drawing on the existing
jurisprudence and scholarship. It aims to provide a clear standard of review
for agency confessions of error, which will enable courts to separate the
legitimate uses of the practice from improper ones.
Part V of this Note returns to the SBZ Rule litigation to examine how a
court would have evaluated the government's attempt to confess error if it
had used the analytical framework recommended in Part IV. Because the
district court in the SBZ Rule litigation has issued an opinion on the
confession of error question, Part V also compares and contrasts this Note's
conclusions with those of the district Court.'16  The Note argues that the
district court reached the right result-that the attempt to confess error in
the SBZ Rule litigation was improper-but it also argues that the court
failed to consider several important factors in its analysis. 17 This analysis
demonstrates how courts should review agency confessions of error, and it
underscores the value of having a consistent framework for other courts to
use in the future.
Finally, Part VI of this Note concludes the analysis with some final
thoughts on the political implications of agency confessions of error.
HI. A Case Study:~ The Stream Buffer Zone Rule Litigation
This Part provides more detailed background information on the SBZ
Rule and associated litigation. It also introduces the practice of agency
confession of error by exploring how the Department of Interior (Interior)
and the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM)
attempted to confess error in litigation concerning revisions to the SBZ
Rule.
The SBZ Rule is an environmental rule that restricts coal mining
activities in and around streams and governs how coal mine operators can
dispose of coal mining waste. 18 The SBZ Rule was adopted pursuant to the
16. Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Salazar, 660 F. Supp. 2d 3, 4 (D.D.C. 2009)
(denying motions to vacate and dismiss).
17. See infra Part V (applying the proposed standard of review and finding that in light
of various interests, the confession of error was improper).
18. See, e.g., OSM News Release, supra note 12 (describing the SBZ rule as placing
"restrictions on how coal mine operators can dispose of coal mine waste and the excess spoil
created by the mining operation").
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Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA),19 which is the
federal law that regulates surface coal mining.2 By providing
environmental protections to streams, the SBZ Rule helps implement
SMCRA, which has the purpose of "assur~ing] that surface coal mining
operations are so conducted as to protect the environment.",2' SMCRA also
establishes OSM as an agency within the Department of Interior, 2 and it
confers authority on OSM to promulgate regulations that relate to surface
coal mining and the purposes of the Act .2
Pursuant to its authority under SMCRA, OSM adopted the first
iteration of the SBZ Rule in 1979,'2 after conducting a notice-and-comment
rulemaking pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.2 In 1983, OSM
conducted another informal rulemaking in order to revise the original SBZ
Rule.2 The 1983 version of the SBZ Rule (1983 SBZ Rule) provided that
mine operators could not conduct surface mining activities within 100 feet
of perennial and intermittent streams, unless they first obtained
authorization from the appropriate regulatory authority.27  This 100-foot
buffer zone requirement was designed to protect streams from
sedimentation and channel disturbance.2
19. See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-
1328 (2006) (regulating coal mining operations with the aim of reducing adverse
environmental effects).
20. See id. § 1202(a) (providing that the purpose of SMCRA is to "establish a
nationwide program to protect society and the environment from the adverse effects of
surface coal mining operations").
21. Id. § 1202(d).
22. See id § 1211 (a) (creating the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and
Enforcement and establishing it within the Department of Interior).
23. See id. § 121 1(c)(2) (conferring authority on the Secretary of interior, acting
through OSM, to publish and promulgate rules and regulations needed to carry out
SMCRA).
24. Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Operations: Permanent Regulatory
Program, 44 Fed. Reg. 14,902 (Mar. 13, 1979).
25. See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (discussing the
elements of notice and comment rulemaking).
26. Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Operations Permanent Regulatory Program;
Stream Buffer Zones and Fish, Wildlife, and Related Environmental Values, 48 Fed. Reg.
30,312 (Jun. 30, 1983).
27. See 30 C.F.R. § 816.57(a) ("No land within 100 feet of a perennial stream. . . shall
be disturbed by surface mining activities. ... unless the regulatory authority specifically
authorizes surface mining activities closer. .. )
28. See Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Operations Permanent Regulatory
Program; Stream Buffer Zones and Fish, Wildlife and Related Environmental Values, 48
Fed. Reg. at 30,312 (describing the environmental benefits afforded by stream buffer zones).
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In 2007, near the end of George W. Bush's second presidential term,
OSM initiated another notice-and-comment rulemaking in order to revise
the SBZ Rule yet again.2 OSM ostensibly undertook the revisions to
reduce confusion surrounding the 1983 SBZ Rule30 and to increase
environmental protection for streams."' However, environmental groups
believed that the proposed revisions would actually reduce environmental
protections for streams.3 They contended that the revisions would favor
coal mining over the environment by making it easier for coal mine
operators to obtain exemptions from the stream buffer zone requirement,
which would have the effect of increasing destructive mining activities in
and around streams.3 Despite these objections, on December 12, 2008,
OSM published a final rule adopting revisions to the SBZ Rule (Revised
SBZ Rule).3 The environmental groups that had objected to the changes
promptly filed suit, challenging the Revised SBZ Rule on the basis that
OSM and Interior had neglected to follow certain procedural
requirements.3
After President Bush left office, the incoming administration of
President Obama expressed disapproval of the Revised SBZ Rule on policy
grounds, apparently sympathizing with the environmental plaintiffs'
concerns that the rule reduced important environmental protections for
streams.3 In a press conference, Secretary of Interior Ken Salazar
29. See Excess Spoil, Coal Mine Waste, and Buffers for Waters of the United States,
72 Fed. Reg. 48,890 (Aug. 24, 2007) (proposing an amendment to OSM's stream buffer
zone regulations to clarify and expand environmental protections for streams).
30. See id. at 48,892 (noting that there has been controversy over the proper
interpretation of the 1983 SBZ Rule, and stating that a purpose of the revisions is to clarify
ambiguities and minimize disputes concerning the application of the SBZ Rule).
31. See id. (stating that a purpose of the revisions is to expand environmental
protections for streams by making the SBZ Rule applicable to all waters of the United States,
instead ofjust perennial and intermittent streams).
32. See, e.g., Scott Kirkwood, A Mountain of Controversy, NAT'L PARKS
CONSERVATION ASS'N MAG. (Winter 2009), available at http://www.npca.org/magazine/
2009/winter/a-mountain-of-controversy.htm (evaluating and criticizing the proposed
revisions to the 1983 SBZ Rule).
33. See id. ("But in April 2007, the Office of Surface Mining (OSM) began
reevaluating rule's interpretation, and in December, the agency effectively removed its
teeth.").
34. Excess Spoil, Coal Mine Waste, and Buffers for Perennial and Intermittent
Streams, 73 Fed. Reg. 75,814 (Dec. 12, 2008).
35. See Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Salazar, No. 09-00115 (D.D.C. filed Feb.
17, 2009) (challenging the Department of Interior's amendment to the Revised SBZ Rule);
Coal River Mountain Watch v. Salazar, No. 08-22 12 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 22, 2008) (same).
36. See Press Release, U.S. Department of Interior, Salazar Moves to Withdraw I11th
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characterized the Revised SBZ Rule as an eleventh hour rule and asserted
that the rule was legally defective .37  However, Secretary Salazar did not
specify' the precise nature of the deficiency at that time.
38
Secretary Salazar' s remarks made it clear that the Obama
administration desired to undo the Revised SBZ Rule. The normal
approach for accomplishing this goal would have been for Interior and
OSM to conduct a new notice-and-comment rulemaking pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act. 39 These agencies had routinely used such
informal rulemakings to make revisions to the SBZ Rule in the past.4
However, instead of initiating a new rulemaking to change the SBZ Rule,
Interior took the unusual step of confessing legal error in the litigation
against the 2008 rulemaking.' Interior specifically acknowledged, as the
environmental plaintiffs had alleged, that OSM had failed to meet a legal
obligation to consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service regarding the
possible effects of the Revised SBZ Rule on threatened and endangered
species.4 On the basis of this error, Interior moved the court to vacate the
Revised SBZ Rule and to remand the matter to the agency.4 3 The agency
reasoned that the case was moot because there was no longer a dispute on
Hour Mountaintop Coal Mining Rule (Apr. 27, 2009), http://www.doi.gov/archive/news/
09_News -Releases/042709.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2010) (quoting Salazar as stating that
"[tihe so-called 'stream buffer zone rule' simply doesn't pass muster with respect to
adequately protecting water quality and stream habitat that communities rely on in coal
country") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
37. See id (noting Secretary of Interior Ken Salazar's concerns with the Revised SBZ
Rule).
38. See id (failing to specify the Revised SBZ Rule's legal deficiency).
39. See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2006) (defining "rule
making' to include the repeal of a rule); id. § 553 (mandating notice and comment
procedures for informal rulemakings).
40. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text (describing how previous revisions
to the SBZ Rule were accomplished by notice-and-comment rulemaking).
41. See Defendant's Motion for Voluntary Remand and Vacatur at 4, Nat'l Parks
Conservation Ass'n v. Salazar, 660 F. Supp. 2d 3 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 09-00115) [hereinafter
Nat 'l Parks Motion] (arguing that the court should vacate the Revised SBZ Rule and remand
to the agency because the Secretary of the Interior had confessed legal error); Federal
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint as Moot at 4, Coal River Mountain Watch v.
Salazar, No. 08-2212 (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 2009) [hereinafter Coal River Motion] (same).
42. See Nat 'l Parks Motion, supra note 4 1, at 2 ("The Secretary has determined that
OSM erred in failing to initiate consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service under
the [Endangered Species Act] to evaluate possible effects of the SBZ Rule on threatened and
endangered species."); Coal River Motion, supra note 4 1, at 2 (same).
43. Nat'l Parks Motion, supra note 41, at 1; Coal River Motion, supra note 41, at 1.
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the merits."4 Moreover, it argued that the court could save valuable judicial
resources by vacating and remanding the rule.4
Interior's proposal to vacate and remand the Revised SBZ Rule would
have had the practical effect of reinstating the 1983 SBZ Rule. 4 6  Thus,
Interior aimed to undo the Revised SBZ Rule-without conducting any
further administrative proceedings-by using a confession of error.4 The
affected mining interests immediately called into question whether
confessing error in this matter was a legitimate exercise of agency power or
an improper shortcut used to achieve political goals.4
As an intervenor in the case, the National Mining Association (NMA)
opposed Interior's motion to vacate and remand the Revised SBZ Rule.4
NMA argued that granting the motion would give the Secretary of Interior
the power to rule on the merits of the litigation.50 Furthermore, NMA
argued that vacating and remanding would violate the Administrative
Procedure Act because it would allow Interior to adopt a new rule (i.e. the
1983 SBZ Rule) without observing the required notice-and-comment
procedures. 51 Ultimately, the District of Columbia District Court found
44. See Nat 'l Parks Motion, supra note 41, at 5 (arguing that Interior's request for
remand and vacatur eliminates any case or controversy between the parties, and thus
obviates the need for judicial resolution of the issues); Coal River Motion. supra note 4 1. at
5 (same).
45. See Nat '7 Parks Motion, supra note 4 1, at 5 ("Moreover, the requested remand
with vacatur will conserve judicial resources."); Coal River Motion, supra note 41, at 5
(same).
46. See Nat '7 Parks Motion, supra note 4 1, at 2-3 ("Vacatur of the SBZ rule would
achieve the result of allowing the prior, valid rule that was in effect on December 11, 2008,
to be reinstated."); Coal River Motion, supra note 41, at 2-3 ("Upon vacatur by this Court,
Federal Defendants anticipate that OSM would issue an emergency regulation formally
withdrawing the SBZ rule and clarifying that the prior, valid rule is applicable.").
47. See Nat 'l Parks Motion, supra note 41, at 3 ("Upon vacatur by this Court, Federal
Defendants anticipate that OSM would issue an emergency regulation formally withdrawing
the SBZ rule and clarifying that the prior, valid rule is applicable.").
48. See Opposition of Intervenor-Defendant National Mining Association to
Defendants' Motion for Voluntary Remand and Vacatur at 6, Nat'l Parks Conservation
Ass'n v. Salazar, 660 F. Supp. 2d 3 (D.D.C. 2009) (No. 09-00115) [hereinafter NMA
Motion] ("[Vacatur] is not a tool for agencies to erase a prior Administration's final,
properly promulgated, currently effective regulations merely to suit a new Administration's
views on public policy.").
49. See id. at 1 (opposing Interior's motion).
50. See id. ("They ask this Court not only to remand the rule but also to vacate it,
thereby lending the Court's endorsement to Secretary Salazar's unilateral 'determination'
late last month that his agency's rule is 'legally defective' and is 'bad public policy."').
5 1. See id. at 13-15 (describing how vacating and remanding the Revised SBZ Rule
would fail to satisfy Administrative Procedure Act requirements for informal rulemaking).
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NMA's arguments more persuasive and it denied Interior's motion to
vacate and remand.5
The district court's opinion ended Interior's attempt to confess error in
the SBZ Rule litigation. But it did not resolve more fundamental issues,
such as whether an agency should be allowed to confess error at all, and if
so, what standards a court should apply to ensure that the technique is not
subject to political abuse. The remaining parts of this Note will explore the
mechanics of confessing error, 53 examine the legal and policy arguments
concerning agency confession of error,514 and analyze the district court's
opinion on Interior's motion to vacate and remand in light of those
arguments.5
The SBZ Rule litigation and Interior's attempt to confess error raise
two important questions of law and policy. First, should a new presidential
administration be able to circumvent the Administrative Procedure Act-
and undo the previous administration's eleventh hour rules-by confessing
that the agency committed legal errors during the rulemaking process? And
second, what standards should a court apply in deciding whether to accept
such a confession of error and to ensure that this practice is not subject to
political abuse?
Answering these questions is important because the practice of agency
confession of error implicates important policy issues. To begin with, the
Administrative Procedure Act requires an agency to conduct a new
rulemaking to repeal a legally effective rule.5 If the court accepted
Interior's confession of error, the agency would be able to circumvent this
requirement and repeal the legally effective Revised SBZ Rule without any
administrative process. Second, the practice is highly susceptible of
political abuse, particularly when a new president has taken office and his
administration is eager to undo the eleventh hour rules adopted by the
outgoing administration. Finally, it upsets the settled expectations of the
regulated parties and the public by undoing a legally effective rule without
any administrative process.
52. See Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Salazar, 660 F. Supp. 2d 3, 4 (D.D.C. 2009)
(denying motions to vacate and dismiss).
53. See infra Part III (discussing modem use of confessions of error).
54. See infra Part IV (discussing the policy objectives underlying the use of
confessions of error).
55. See infra Part V (applying the proposed standard of review to Secretary of Interior
Ken Salazar's confession of error).
56. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (describing Administrative Procedure
Act requirements for repeal of a legally effective rule).
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III. Existing Standards of Judicial Review for Confessions of Error
This Part will review how courts have responded to agency
confessions of error and then examine the standards of review that courts
have applied to confessions of error made by other departments within the
executive branch. This Part begins by examining judicial opinions that
address confessions of error by administrative agencies. Next, it reviews
the use of confession of error by the Solicitor General in the Supreme
Court. 57 And finally, it reviews the confession of error by attorneys general
and prosecutors in criminal matters. As part of this review, the Note
considers whether the standards of review for Solicitors General and
prosecutors could be extended to the agency context.
A. Administrative Agencies
Federal district courts have accepted agency confessions of error and
granted motions to remand in various proceedings, but they have not
articulated any clear standard for determining when such confessions
should be accepted. This Part reviews the factors that courts have
considered in deciding whether to accept agency confessions of error. It
also highlights the fact that courts have made these decisions on a case-by-
case basis, without the benefit of a consistent standard of review.
In some cases, district courts have accepted agency confessions of
error and granted motions to remand for the purpose of conserving judicial
and litigant resources.5 Their rationale is that if the agency has agreed that
it made a mistake, then forcing the litigation to continue will waste the
resources of parties on both sides of the dispute and of the judiciary itself.59
In this scenario, accepting the agency's confession of error achieves the
same result that the litigation ultimately would, but the parties involved and
57. See, e.g., Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 2092 n. 105 (reviewing the solicitor
general's practice of confessing error and evaluating concerns about the practice and its
susceptibility to abuse).
58. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. Browner, 989 F.2d 522, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("We
commonly grant such motions, preferring to allow agencies to cure their own mistakes rather
than wasting the courts' and the parties' resources reviewing a record that both sides
acknowledge to be incorrect or incomplete.").
59. See id (emphasizing the importance of considering party and judicial resources
when deciding whether to accept a confession of error).
1206
CONFESSION OF ERROR BYADMNISTRA TIVE AGENCIES 10
the court do not need to expend any additional resources to realize that
result .6
In examining an administrative agency's confession of error, federal
courts will also evaluate the seriousness of the agency's alleged error and
the confession's potential for disruptive consequences .6 ' District courts
have thus granted agency motions to vacate rules and remand when the
vacatur would not lead to "significant disruptive consequences. 6
According to one formulation, when a court sets out to determine what
constitutes a significant disruptive consequence, it "cannot rely upon
intervenors' abstract policy arguments; rather, there must be some factual
basis for determining what the disruptive consequences might be."6
Vacating a regulation would not result in a significant disruptive
consequence, for example, if other overlapping regulations were in place
and would perform the same function as the vacated regulation. 64
District courts also will evaluate the seriousness of the deficiencies in
the completed rulemaking in deciding whether to vacate and remand.6 But
even upon finding that a rulemaking suffers from serious deficiencies, the
court need not automatically vacate the rule.6
Indeed, despite the tendency of the federal courts to accept agency
confessions of error, such acceptance is hardly guaranteed. The Supreme
Court itself has stated that it is not compelled to accept a confession of error
simply because opposing parties have come to an agreement on the issue.6
60. See id. (noting that the same result would occur regardless of whether the
confession of error is accepted).
61. See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comin'n, 988 F.2d 146, 150-
51 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("The decision whether to vacate depends on 'the seriousness of the
order's deficiencies (and thus the extent of doubt whether the agency chose correctly) and
the disruptive consequences of an interim change that may itself be changed."' (quoting Int'l
Union v. Fed. Mine Safety and Health Admin., 920 F.2d 960, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990))).
62. Bldg. Indus. Legal Def. Found. v. Norton, 231 F. Supp. 2d 100, 105 (D.D.C.
2002).
63. Id. at 106.
64. See id. at 106-07 (determining that vacating the critical habitat designation for the
endangered Arroyo Toad was not a significant disruption because "overlapping regulatory
structures" were in place to protect the toad and its riparian and vernal pool habitats).
65. See Allied-Signal, Inc., 988 F.2d at 150-51 (stating that the decision to vacate
should depend on the seriousness of the deficiencies).
66. See id at 150 ("An inadequately supported rule, however, need not necessarily be
vacated.").
67. See Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258 (1942) (stating that a confession of
error does not relieve the Supreme Court from performing its judicial function); see also
Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 2112 ("Several justices have noted in dicta in confession of
error cases that the Court is not compelled to accept the position of opposing parties who
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And moreover, several of the justices on the Supreme Court have expressed
strong disapproval for the practice of confessing error.6
In short, federal courts decide whether to accept an agency's
confession of error by making individualized assessments of each case.
Depending on the court and the case in question, these assessments put
weight on factors such as the seriousness of the alleged error; the potential
disruption that would be caused by accepting the confession; the
speculativeness of that potential disruption; and the prospect of conserving
the resources of the parties and the court. 69 Most significantly, some courts
and individual jurists are more receptive to confessions of error than
others.7  In combination, these individual preferences and the lack of a
consistent standard of judicial review make it difficult to predict whether a
court will accept an agency's confession of error in any particular case.
B. Solicitors General
Among his other duties, the Solicitor General is responsible for
reviewing cases that the federal government has lost in the federal district
courts and courts of appeal, and for deciding which of those losses to
appeal.7 If the Solicitor General chooses to appeal a case to the Supreme
Court, and the Court grants review, then the Solicitor General represents the
executive branch before the Supreme Court, drafting the government's
briefs and presenting its oral arguments.7 The Solicitor General is also
agree on an issue.").
68. See, e.g., REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF
LAW 120-21 (1992) (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Rinaldi v. United States,
434 U.S. 22 (1977) in which he criticized the majority for accepting the government's
confession of error in a criminal case when the asserted error did not affect the defendant's
guilt or innocence).
69. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text (reviewing various factors that
courts have emphasized in reviewing confessions of error).
70. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (discussing how courts and jurists
have varying individual preferences for the practice of confessing error).
71. See LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE
RULE OF LAW (1987) 6-7 (describing the solicitor general's gatekeeping role in deciding
which of the government's cases to appeal); UBERTACCIO, supra note 8, at 8-9 (summarizing
the solicitor general's roles and duties).
72. See CAPLAN, supra note 71, at 3 ("The Solicitor General's principal task is to
represent the Executive Branch of the government in the Supreme Court,. .. )
UBERTACCIO, supra note 8, at 8-9 (summarizing the solicitor general's roles and duties).
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responsible for representing the federal government as amicus curiae in the
Supreme Court."3
When the Solicitor General reviews a case from a lower court that he
believes was wrongly decided in favor of the government, he may admit
this mistake to the Supreme Court74 and ask the Court to reverse the
judgment of the lower court despite the government's victory.7" This
practice by the Solicitor General is an example of a confession of error.7
Confessing error is a time-honored custom in the Solicitor General's office
and it reflects the view that "[t]he United States wins its point whenever
justice is done its citizens in the courts."7 7 The Solicitor General confesses
error to ensure that justice is done and to serve as a check on the political
ambitions of the Department of Justice, which is more closely accountable
to the President.7 The Solicitor General most often confesses error in
criminal cases, where he believes that the criminal defendant below was
innocent of the crime or was denied important procedural rights in the
course of the prosecution. 
8 0
As with agency confession of error, a Solicitor General's confession of
error is potentially subject to abuse. One commentator has noted that
because he is a "strategic political actor, the solicitor general's decisions
can affect the development of both judicial and executive policy."'
81
73. See UBERTACCIO, supra note 8, at 8 ("[T]hird, the OSG represents the government
in amicus curiae briefs, where the government has a substantial interest in a case to which it
is not a party.").
74. See Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 2080 ("The Solicitor General confesses error
when she admits to the Supreme Court that a lower court has committed an error in a case
decided in favor of the Government.").
75. See id. ("Upon confessing error, the Solicitor General may ask the Court to reverse
the judgment or may argue either that the judgment should stand despite the error or that the
case does not merit review under the Court's standards for granting certiorari.").
76. See id (describing the circumstances under which the Solicitor General might
confess error).
77. See CAPLAN, supra note 71, at 17 (quoting Solicitor General Frederick Lehmann
on the use of confessions or error to achieve justice).
78. See UBERTACCIO, supra note 8, at 170-72 (reviewing the solicitor general's
practice of confessing error).
79. See Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 2080-81 ("The vast majority of confessions of
error occur in criminal cases."); CAPLAN, supra note 71, at 9 ("Most confessions of error
involve criminal convictions,...)
80. See CAPLAN, supra note 71, at 9 (noting that confessions of error in criminal cases
"happen for a range of reasons: a jury was selected unfairly; a judge gave faulty instructions
to the jury before asking its members to reach a verdict; there was scant evidence supporting
the verdict").
8 1. SALOKAR, supra note 68, at 7.
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Because he plays these dual roles, the Solicitor General may occasionally
be tempted to confess error for purely tactical reasons-for example, to
prevent the Supreme Court from ruling on a case when he fears that the
decision may have adverse consequences for the government in future
cases. 82 When he does this, the Solicitor General engages in a cost-benefit
analysis, deciding that the future benefits to the government that would be
obtained by avoiding a final ruling outweigh the costs of sacrificing the
government's victory in the case below. 
83
Because the Solicitor General has the potential to abuse the practice of
confessing error, the Supreme Court has not always been inclined to accept
his confessions.8 Formner Solicitor General Archibald Cox reported that in
his very first oral argument before the Supreme Court, he attempted to
confess error 8 General Cox had anticipated a trouble-free appearance
before the Court, but the justices did not receive his confession of error
well.8 Instead, they peppered him with skeptical questions about the
government's position and later ruled unanimously against him.8
One example of a case in which the Solicitor General arguably abused
the practice of confessing error for strategic reasons was Environmental
Protection Agency v. Brown.8 In Brown, the Solicitor General represented
to the Supreme Court that the government's position in the lower courts
was contrary to the Clean Air Act, and then asked the Court for a vacatur in
order to avoid a more sweeping adverse ruling on the merits.89 As Justice
82. See Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 2096 (noting that a Solicitor General may abuse
the practice of confessing error by "sacrificfing] victory in the immediate case to avoid a
ruling on the merits of some issue").
83. See id (describing how the Solicitor General might perform a cost-benefit analysis
when deciding whether to confess error).
84. See Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258 (1942) (stating that the Supreme
Court will not blindly accept a confession of error in lieu of performing its judicial funmction).
85. See SALOKAR, supra note 68, at 65 (recounting an interview with Solicitor General
Cox and quoting him as saying, "I went up .. . with a prepared statement as to why we were
confessing error and hardly opened my mouth than all nine justices jumped down my
throat').
86. See id (noting that General Cox believed the Court would readily accept the
confession of error).
87. See id (discussing the Justices' critical attitude towards the government's
confession of error).
88. See Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99, 104 (1977) (vacating the circuit
court judgments below and remanding for consideration of mootness after the Solicitor
General admitted that the environmental regulations in dispute were invalid).
89. See id at 103 (describing the Solicitor General's argument to the Court); see also
Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 2099 (arguing that the case "involved an unusual, yet effective,
strategic confession by which the Solicitor General persuaded the Court that the case was
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Stevens noted in dissent, "By vacating the judgments below, the Court
hands the federal parties a partial victory as a reward for an apparent
concession that their position is not supported by the statute.""0
Courts and commentators have split on what standards should be
applied in determining whether to permit the Solicitor General to confess
error at the Supreme Court. One commentator has proposed a
reasonableness standard for reviewing Solicitor General confessions of
error. 9' On this view, the Solicitor General should put his personal opinion
aside and defend against a constitutional challenge if there is a reasonable
ground for doing So. 92
David Rosenzweig has suggested a set of standards for reviewing
confessions of error by Solicitors General.9 He begins by dividing
confession of error cases into several discrete categories, and then proposes
a standard for reviewing cases in each category.9 In his view, the first
category involves cases where the Solicitor General confesses a
"straightforward" error of fact, law, or procedure. 95 He argues that in these
cases, if there is no indication of strategic motivation, then the Court should
accept the confession and reverse. 96  This standard of review could
potentially be extended to the administrative agency context. Under this
standard, when an agency makes a good faith confession of error on a
straightforward issue of law, fact, or procedure, the court should accept the
confession and vacate and remand to the agency's discretion.
moot, thus avoiding a significant statutory or constitutional ruling against the Government").
90. Brown, 431 U.S. at 104 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive
Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 733 (2005) ("The demanding standard for confessions of
error, for example, calls on the [Solicitor General] to defend against a constitutional
challenge where there is a reasonable ground for doing so, even if, in his own best view, the
federal action was unconstitutional.").
92. See id ("[R]ather than expressing his own independent judgment and declining to
pursue a case . .. , the [Solicitor General] ... makes it a priority to funnel disputes to the
Court for decision, and to avoid making decisions that would pretermit Court
consideration.").
93. See Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 2092-101 (identifying three categories of
confession of error cases and recommending a judicial standard of review for each).
94. See id. (identifying three categories of confession of error cases and
recommending a judicial standard of review for each).
95. See id at 2106 (describing the first category of confession of error cases as those
"involv[ing] a clear, reversible error of law, fact, or procedure").
96. See id. ("Where a confession involves a clear, reversible error of law, fact, or
procedure, the Solicitor General renders a service to the Court by drawing the error to its
attention; in such cases, the Court should in almost all instances summarily reverse.").
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According to Rosenzweig, a second category of cases involves
confessions of error on matters that fall squarely within the government's
discretion.97 This scenario typically arises in the context of prosecutorial
discretion policies.98  On Rosenzweig's view, if the Solicitor General
confesses error as to the application of a prosecutorial discretion policy, the
Court should conduct at least a minimal review of the record to ascertain
that the Solicitor General does not have a strategic motivation.99 The
rationale for this standard is that if the Solicitor General knows that his
confession of error will be subject to some review-rather than
mechanically accepted-then he will be unlikely to attempt an abuse of the
practice.'O As with the standard of review for the first category of cases,
this standard could potentially be extended to the administrative agency
context. Under this standard, when the agency confesses error on a matter
of policy within its discretion, the court should undertake at least a minimal
review to determine the risk of abuse and to assess whether the agency
might have a strategic motivation. If the court finds no risk of abuse of
strategic motivation, then it should accept the confession of error.
A third category of cases-which includes the most problematic
ones-are those where the Solicitor General has clearly engaged in a
strategic confession of error.10' According to Rosenzweig, to discourage
such purely strategic confessions of error, the Court should adopt the
practice of "refusing to accept any confessions of error at all, denying a
larger portion of the Government's certiorari petitions, or more frequently
ruling against the Solicitor General's positions in cases decided on the
merits." 102 Unlike the recommended standard for the first two categories of
cases, this standard is difficult to extend to the agency context because it
does not provide a true standard. Instead, it proposes to impose a
97. See id. at 2094-95 (identifying a second category of cases as those that involve
prosecutorial discretion policies).
98. See id. (discussing the use of confessions of error "to effectuate the purposes of (a
discretionary Justice Department] policy").
99. See id. at 2110 ("While the Court should not automatically deny certiorari in
[discretionary prosecution policy] cases, it should undertake at least a minimal independent
review of the record in order to deter executive temptation to abuse [discretionary
prosecution policy] confessions of error for strategic purposes.").
100. See id at 2109 ("[11f the Solicitor General knows that the Court will not
mechanically accept all confessions, the temptation for the Solicitor General to abuse this
type of confession of error will greatly decrease.").
101. See id. at 2095-101 (identifying a third category of cases as those that involve
strategic confessions of error).
102. Id. at 2113-14.
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disciplinary action that would not be applicable in the agency context.
Moreover, unlike administrative agencies, Solicitors General have a special
relationship with the Court because over time they have prepared
consistent, high quality, politically neutral arguments on which the Court
has come to rely.'103 Because an administrative agency is unlikely to have
the special, long-term relationship with the trial court that the Solicitor
General has with the Supreme Court, these remedial measures are less
likely to be effective in any event.
In summary, the legal scholarship has proposed standards for
reviewing confessions of error by the Solicitor General, and these proposed
standards could be extended to uncontroversial confessions of error by
administrative agencies.1'4 However, the scholarship does not provide a
standard of review that extends perfectly to the more controversial agency
confessions of error-such as Interior's confession of error in the SBZ Rule
litigation-that are the focus of this Note. 
105
C. Prosecutors
For the same reasons that Solicitors General occasionally confess error
in criminal cases, prosecutors occasionally do the same. According to
Professors Green and Yaroshefsky, "[p]rosecutors have a tradition, not
uniformly honored, of 'confessing' or correcting error when they learn that
discovery material was wrongly withheld or other procedural violations
occurred."106 The practice is not "uniformly honored" because, as with the
Solicitor General, the decision to confess error is left entirely to the
prosecutor's discretion."' 7
103. See id. at 2083-87 (describing the close relationship between the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Supreme Court); SALOKAR, supra note 68, at 119 (same);
UBERTACCIO, supra note 8, at 170-72 (same).
104. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text (arguing that Rosenzweig's
proposed standards of review for the first and second categories of cases could extend to the
administrative agency context).
105. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text (arguing that Rosenzweig's
proposed standard of review for the third category of cases does not extend to the
administrative agency context).
106. Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-
Conviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OWiO ST. J. CRIm. L. 467,475 (2009).
107. See Long v. Satz, 181 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11Ith Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (agreeing
with the district court that "'[tihe task of evaluating the credibility of the alleged exculpatory
information, and of determining its bearing on the trial and the prosecutor's decision whether
to confess error and agree to have the verdict set aside, no doubt requires the exercise of
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Indeed, there are many similarities between confessions of error by the
Solicitor General and confessions of error by prosecutors. Like the
Solicitor General, prosecutors confess error in criminal cases because of
their unique professional obligation to seek justice.10 8  On this view, the
public trust reposed in prosecutors compels them to confess error when a
miscarriage of justice otherwise might result.' 09 If a prosecutor wins a
conviction against a defendant who he later learns to be innocent, he should
sacrifice the government's victory in the case in order to do justice and
vindicate the public trust vested in his office."0
The salient question is what standard of review should a court employ
in assessing a prosecutor's confession of error? As it turns out, courts
readily accept prosecutorial confessions of error for the same reason that
prosecutors make them-to avoid miscarriages of justice, which would taint
the criminal justice system and reduce public confidence in verdicts.'
However, the Supreme Court has advised that the government's confession
of error does not relieve the judiciary from its responsibility to perform its
judicial function.' 12  In other words, the court should undertake some
review of the government's confession of error before deciding to accept
it.'113 But again, the federal courts have not established any clear standard
for reviewing a prosecutor's confession of error.
prosecutorial discretion"').
108. See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"? 26 FoRDHAM URn.
L.J. 607,615 (1999) (considering the relationship between confession of error and the role of
prosecutors in the justice system).
109. See Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258 (1942) ("The public trust reposed
in the law enforcement officers of the Government requires that they be quick to confess
error when, in their opinion, a miscarriage of justice may result from their remaining
silent.... [S]uch a confession does not relieve this Court of the performance of the judicial
finction.").
1 10. See id (discussing a prosecutor's duty to the public interest).
I111. See Green, supra note 108, at 615 (discussing the judicial system's responsibility
to provide justice).
112. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court
opinions in which justices have suggested that the Court should not automatically accept
confessions of error).
113. See Young, 315 U.S. at 258 ("But such a confession does not relieve this Court of
the performance of the judicial function.").
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IV. Recommended Standard of Judicial Review for Confessions of Error by
Administrative Agencies
The need for a single coherent standard of judicial review for agency
confessions of error is manifest. As this Note has shown, courts have
grappled with the issue of when to accept problematic confessions of error,
but they have not forged a consensus as to what standard of review should
apply."14  To date the courts have tended to ferret out problematic
confessions of error on a case-by-case basis by looking for indications of
political abuse or other improper motivations." 5 The problem with this
approach is that it is inconsistent and unpredictable. In turn, this
unpredictability prevents administrative agencies from determining in
advance whether confessing error is an appropriate strategy, and it prevents
regulated parties from assessing the likelihood of an agency's success in
confessing error. To rectify this shortcoming in the confession of error
jurisprudence, this Note recommends a comprehensive standard that courts
should apply when assessing agency confessions of error. This standard
will draw on the existing case law,"16 supplementing it with ideas from the
legal scholarship on confessions of error in other contexts
1 17
A. Policy Considerations
At the outset, it is important to acknowledge that agency confessions
of error can serve legitimate purposes."18 The practice of confessing error
did not evolve by accident: It exists because it has valid applications.
To begin with, forcing an agency to litigate and defend an admittedly
defective rule will waste the limited resources of both the agency and the
judiciary." 9 Accepting a confession of error can help a court manage its
114. See supra notes 58-66, 69 and accompanying text (reviewing a variety of different
standards and factors that courts have applied in reviewing agency confessions of error).
115. See, e.g., supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text (describing how the district
court in the SBZ Rule litigation looked for specific indications of political abuse in making
its decision to refuse Interior's confession of error).
116. See supra Part III.A (analyzing the case law on judicial standards of review for
agency confessions of error).
117. See supra Parts 111.13 and ILLC (analyzing the legal scholarship on confessions of
error by solicitors general and prosecutors).
118. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. Browner, 989 F.2d 522, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (accepting a
confession of error to save the courts' and the parties' resources).
119. See id (emphasizing the importance of considering judicial resources when
deciding whether to accept a confession of error).
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docket and ensure the proper and fair administration of justice. 120
Moreover, accepting a confession of error reduces the harm to the regulated
party that would stem from the delay and uncertainty inherent in further
litigation. 1'For example, in the SBZ Rule litigation, the regulated mining
companies will remain unaware during the pendency of the litigation of
what version of the SBZ Rule they will ultimately be required to follow.
As a result, they are likely to suffer very real business costs.
Second, there are logistical problems inherent in forcing an agency to
defend a rule with which it disagrees. For example, in the SBZ Rule
litigation, the district court refuised to accept Interior's confession of
error. 22Interior will now proceed to defend the SBZ Rule on the merits,
notwithstanding the fact that the agency has publicly gone on record
arguing that the rule is not only bad public policy, but also that it is legally
defective.12 3  The agency is strongly prejudiced against the rule, yet the
court has required the agency to defend it. It is clear that the agency has a
conflict of interest.
In the SBZ Rule litigation, the mining interests are represented by
NMA-a powerful political association that the court has allowed to
intervene in the litigation.12 4 As an intervenor, NMA will be able to defend
the Revised SBZ Rule in the litigation on its own terms. Thus, despite
Interior's conflict of interest, the mining companies can ensure that their
interests will be adequately represented in court. But what about the
hypothetical case where the regulated party does not have the resources to
mount its own defense or is otherwise unable to intervene? In that case
there is a very real possibility that the litigation against the rule will be
entirely one-sided, and therefore not particularly useful in resolving the
controversy.
Third, in a related point, justiciability problems emerge when the court
forces an agency to defend a rule with which the agency disagrees.12
120. See Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 2117 ("When employed in proper circumstances,
confessions of error can serve important ends, including assisting the Court in managing its
docket and ensuring the proper and fair administration ofjustice.").
121. See id. (emphasizing the importance of considering party resources when deciding
whether to accept a confession of error).
122. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (noting the district court's order that
rejected Interior's attempt to confess error in the SBZ Rule litigation).
123. See supra notes 36-37, 41-43 and accompanying text (detailing Interior's public
criticisms of the rule and its confession of legal error in the SB3Z Rule litigation).
124. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (describing NMA's role as an
intervening party in the SBZ Rule litigation).
125. See Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 2113 ("In the rare instance in which the
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These problems arise because the United States Constitution limits the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to deciding active cases and
controversies. 16If the defendant agency agrees with the plaintiff that the
rule is legally defective and it confesses error in the rulemaking, then there
is no longer a case or controversy. 127 Instead, the case is rendered moot. Of
course, if the litigation involves an intervening party, or if the court has
appointed substitute counsel, 128 a controversy may persist. But when there
is no intervenor, for all practical purposes the case or controversy has
disappeared-and the claim is no longer justiciable.
For all these legitimate concerns about problems that arise when courts
reject agency confessions of error, there also exist formidable policy
considerations that weigh in favor of rejecting confessions of error. First, if
a court accepts an agency's confession of error in rulemaking litigation and
vacates a final rule-as Interior sought to do in the SBZ Rule litigation-
then the court effectively allows the agency to undertake a new rulemaking
without any administrative process and without any public involvement.1
2 9
Put another way, it gives the agency unilateral discretion to adopt a new
final rule.' 30 This process subverts public involvement in developing the
regulation, which is antithetical to the purposes of the Administrative
Procedure Act.'13 1
Second, accepting an agency confession of error upsets the settled
expectations of the regulated party by instituting a new and different rule
without any opportunity for that party to participate. For example, in the
SBZ Rule litigation, accepting Interior's confession of error and vacating
the Revised SBZ Rule would have severely prejudiced NMIA and the
mining interests it represents. 3 Those regulated parties participated
Government refuses to defend ajudgment, the Court might face justiciability problems.").
126. See U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2, ci. I (restricting the federal judicial power to cases
and controversies).
127. See Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 2113 (describing how an agency's confession of
error may create justiciability problems).
128. See id (noting that if "the Court is determined to decide the case on the merits, it
can appoint counsel to argue on behalf of the Government").
129. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text (raising policy concerns about
Interior's attempt to confess error in the SBZ Rule litigation).
130. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (describing how vacating and remanding
would permit Interior to adopt a new rule).
131. See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552-53 (2006) (imposing
requirements on administrative agencies to make information available to the public and
providing for public participation in the rulemaking process).
132. See NAM Motion, supra note 48, at 2-3 (describing how NMA's members
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extensively in the Revised SBZ Rule rulemaking and had a legitimate
interest in seeing the agency follow through with the final SBZ Rule it
adopted. 13 3  To allow the agency to repeal the legally effective rule by
administrative decree and replace it with a new rule would prejudice the
regulated parties and, once again, run contrary to the purposes of the
Administrative Procedure Act.'1
34
Finally, agency confessions of error, like the Solicitor General's
confessions of error, 13 1 carry a high risk of political abuse. Again, the SBZ
Rule litigation provides a relevant example. The Revised SBZ Rule was a
so-called eleventh hour rule-a rule that was adopted at the very end of an
outgoing presidential administration precisely because it was too politically
controversial to have been adopted earlier. 316  When new administrations
take office they may be eager to undo the eleventh hour rules of the prior
administration-particularly those rules that concern areas on which the
two administrations have policy differences. 13 7 In the case of the Revised
SBZ Rule this is exactly what happened. President Bush's Interior
promulgated a controversial rule that arguably weakened environmental
protections for streams in order to benefit the coal mining industry.
1 8
When the more environmentally friendly Obamna administration took
power, Interior switched its position and decided that the rule was bad
public policy for that very reason.139 However, instead of conducting a new
rulemaking as required by the Administrative Procedure Act, the Obama
participated in deliberations with government officials during the six-year rulemaking that
produced the Revised SBZ Rule, and noting that NMA's members have a stake in the
outcome of the litigation).
133. See id. (same).
134. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text (detailing the purposes of the
Administrative Procedure Act and arguing that they would be subverted by vacating and
remanding to the agency).
135. See Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 2079-80 (describing a political controversy that
ensued when President Clinton's Solicitor General successfully confessed error in a child
pornography case that the previous administration had prosecuted).
136. See supra notes 36-37 (discussing Secretary of Interior Salazar's characterization
of the Revised SBZ Rule as an eleventh hour rule).
137. See, e.g., supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing the Obama
administration's disapproval of the Revised SBZ Rule adopted in the last few months of the
Bush administration).
138. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (explaining the underlying political
motivations for the Bush administration's revisions to the SBZ Rule and the objections made
by environmental groups).
139. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing the shift in Interior's
position on the Revised SBZ Rule under the Obama administration).
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administration attempted to vacate the completed rulemaking by confessing
error in the pending litigation.140 This type of maneuvering illustrates how
the executive branch can use a confession of error as a strategic tactic.
Because confession of error carries such a high risk of abuse during
political transitions, it is critical that courts have a consistent standard of
review for evaluating agency confessions of error. Drawing on
Rosenzweig's classification scheme, as described above,'14 1 this Part
recommends standards of judicial review for different types of agency
confessions of error.
B. Type I Cases-Straightforward Errors
To separate legitimate uses of confession of error from improper ones,
the court should first assess the possibility that the confession is being used
for strategic purposes. If the confession is based on a straightforward error
of law, fact, or procedure-and it does not entail a risk of political abuse or
is not susceptible of abuse-then the court should accept that confession of
error with minimal additional review.142 But if the court does discern a risk
of abuse or strategic motivation, then further review is warranted.
C. Type II Cases-Matters of Agency Discretion
Similarly, if the contested point is purely a matter of agency discretion,
the court should undertake a mmal review to ensure that the agency does
not have strategic or political motivations.143 If that review does not turn up
any cause for concern, then the court should accept the agency's confession
of error. But if the court can find a risk of strategic or political motivation,
then again it should conduct further review.
140. See supra notes 41-45 alid accompanying text (discussing Interior's confession of
error in the Revised SB3Z Rule litigation).
141. See supra notes 93-103 and accompanying text (describing Rosenzweig's
classification scheme for confessions of error by the Solicitor General).
142. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (reviewing a proposed standard of
judicial review for confessions of error by the Solicitor General).
143. See supra notes 97-1 00 and accompanying text (reviewing a proposed standard of
judicial review for confessions of error by the Solicitor General).
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D. Type III Cases-Strategic Confessions
The more problematic-and more common-scenario is where the
agency's confession of error does raise the specter of political abuse. This
will be the case anytime the confession of error is seriously contested,
anytime the court could discern a possible improper motivation for the
confession, and anytime the confession threatens the rights of an interested
third party.'"4 This is certainly the scenario that arose in the SBZ Rule
litigation.14 5 In such cases, the court must take great care to ensure that the
confession of error is appropriate and will serve the interests of justice.
Specifically, the court should accomplish this by analyzing several
factors and balancing the interests favoring the confession of error against
those opposing the confession of error. This should not prove overly
difficult for the judiciary, as courts frequently employ such balancing
tests-which take into account the relative strengths of the parties'
interests-in other areas of the law.146
First, the court should evaluate the government's interest in confessing
error, including its interest in conserving resources, and it should contrast
that with the countervailing risk of political abuse. Second, the court
should look to the regulated party's interest in resisting the confession of
error, including whether there is a possibility of "significant disruptive
consequences."147  Third, the court should evaluate the general public's
interest in the outcome of the case and the potential harm to the public from
losing its opportunity to participate in the proceedings. Fourth, the court
should evaluate the judiciary's interest, which will focus on the extent to
which accepting the confession of error will conserve judicial resources.
None of these interests should be dispositive. Rather the court should
balance the interests of the parties favoring a confession of error against
those resisting a confession of error. In deciding whether the interests of
justice would be served by allowing the confession of error, the court
should pay close attention to the risk of political manipulation as analyzed
144. See Rosenzweig, supra note 4, at 2095-101 (discussing strategic confessions of
error).
145. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text (describing how Interior's attempt
to confess error in the SBZ Rule litigation raised policy concerns and suggested the
possibility of political abuse).
146. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347-48 (1976) (announcing a
balancing test which weighs an individual's interest against the government's interest and
the public's interest).
147. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (reviewing the significant
disruptive consequences test and exploring its policy rationale).
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in the first step. Any hint of political abuse should militate strongly against
accepting the confession of error.
V The Recommended Standard Applied: Revisiting the Stream Buffer
Zone Rule Litigation
This Part of the Note applies the analytical framework recommended
in Part IV to the proposed confession of error in the SBZ Rule litigation. It
also examines and critiques the district court's analysis in that case, where
the court ultimately refused to accept the confession of error. This Part
argues that the district court reached the correct conclusion, but that it
omitted an evaluation of several important factors. This Part provides a
more complete evaluation of the confession of error, first deciding how to
classify the confession of error (i.e. deciding what type of case it is), and
then applying the recommended standard of review.
As noted above, Interior's confession of error in the SBZ Rule
litigation is one of the more challenging Type III cases because it presents
the risk of political abuse and has been contested by an intervening party.'4
Because it is a Category III case, the court should review the confession of
error by evaluating the respective interests of the agency (Interior), the
regulated parties (the mining companies and NMIA), the public, and the
judiciary. The court should then balance the interests weighing in favor of
the confession of error with those weighing against it to determine whether
to accept the confession of error.
A. Agency's Interest
The first step in the proposed analytical framework is to evaluate the
government's interest in confessing error.'149  This involves two
components: (1) evaluating whether the government has a legitimate
interest in confessing error, and (2) evaluating the countervailing risk that
the government has an improper political motivation and is using the
confession of error as a strategic tactic.
148. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (arguing that the S13Z Rule litigation is
an example of a Type III case).
149. See supra Part IV.D (proposing an analytical framework for evaluating agency
confessions of error in which the court should first balance the government's legitimate
interests in confessing error against the countervailing risk that the government is engaging
in political subterfuge).
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An agency will almost always have a legitimate interest in conserving
its limited resources by stopping litigation when it believes that its action is
legally indefensible in court. The SBZ Rule litigation is no exception. In
its pleadings Interior alleged that the SBZ Rule was legally defective
because OSM had failed to initiate a consultation with the Fish and Wildlife
Service' 50) as required by Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act."5 ' If the
agency's contention is accepted as true, then the rule was legally defective,
and forcing the agency to defend the rule from the environmental groups'
challenge would waste the agency's time and legal resources on a moot
controversy.
Despite the agency's valid interest in conserving its resources,
however, the SBZ Rule confession of error carries a countervailing risk of
political abuse. To begin with, it is clear that the Obama administration
disliked the 2008 SBZ Rule as a matter of environmental Policy.512
Secretary of Interior Salazar publicly went on record-in both a press
conference and a news release-to attack the substance and legality of the
Revised SBZ Rule.'113 This suggests that Interior had a political motivation
for confessing error, and it raises the prospect that the Obama
administration intended to confess error as a strategic tactic to undo an
eleventh hour rule with which it disagreed as a matter of policy. Because of
the risk that the Obama administration had a political motivation for
confessing error, and because accepting Interior's confession of error would
permit Interior to avoid the lengthy Administrative Procedure Act
rulemaking procedures necessary to repeal the rule, the agency's legitimate
interest in conserving its resources is not determinative. Instead, the
interests of the other affected groups must be considered and balanced
against Interior's interests in determining whether to accept its confession
of error.
Under the recommended analytical framework, the district court in the
SBZ Rule litigation did not properly evaluate the government's interest for
two reasons. First, the district court failed to recognize Interior's legitimate
150. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (describing the supposed grounds
for Interior's confession of error).
151. See Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2006) (requiring
federal agencies to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service to ensure that their actions do
not jeopardize listed species or their critical habitats).
152. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (describing how Secretary of
Interior Salazar criticized the Revised SBZ Rule for reducing important environmental
protections for streams).
153. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (discussing the content of Secretary
of Interior Salazar's press conference and news release).
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interest in conserving its resources by ending the litigation. 1 14  Second, the
district court failed to evaluate the risk that Interior was using the confession
of error as a strategic tactic to accomplish political goals.' Instead, the court
devoted most of its analysis to distinguishing the cases that Interior offered to
support its attempt to confess error.'516 The district court may have been right
to distinguish Interior's precedent on the facts, but as this Note has argued,
the courts should develop a consistent standard for reviewing confessions of
error rather than making determinations on a case-by-case basis.
B. Regulated Party's Interest
The second step in the proposed analytical framework is to evaluate the
regulated party's interest in the outcome of the agency's attempt to confess
error.'517 In particular, this analysis should focus on what the regulated party
has at stake in the outcome of the litigation and the extent to which the




In the SBZ Rule litigation, the regulated parties are the individual coal
mining companies, which are collectively represented by NMA.'5 9 These
m-ining interests have much at stake in the outcome of the litigation, and they
have legitimate reasons for resisting Interior's attempt to confess error. First,
the mining companies played a significant role in the Revised SBZ
Rulemaking by collaborating with Interior and by taking advantage of the
opportunities for public involvement.16 0  They further demonstrated their
154. See generally Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Salazar, 660 F. Supp. 2d 3
(D.D.C. 2009) (omitting any discussion of the Interior's interest in confessing error to
conserve resources).
155. See generally id (omitting any discussion of the risk that Interior was using the
confession of error as a political tactic).
156. See i. at 4 ("The cases cited by the Federal defendants provide scant support for
their position that remand and vacatur is appropriate here because the circumstances
addressed in those cases are materially different from those extant here.").
157. See .supra Part IV.D (proposing an analytical framework for evaluating agency
confessions of error in which the court should evaluate the regulated party's interest in the
confession of error).
158. See supra Part IV.D (discussing the interests at stake when analyzing a confession
of error).
159. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text (describing the coal mining
companies' participation in the Revised SBZ Rulemaking and noting their interest in the
outcome of the litigation).
160. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text (describing the extent of the
NMA's role in the rulemaking).
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interest in the SBZ Rule by intervening in the litigation.'16' Second, the
mining companies have an economic interest in the SBZ Rule because it
dictates how they will be able to operate their businesses.162 It is true that no
permits have been issued pursuant to the Revised SBZ Rule,' 63 so the mining
companies do not have any vested interest in the revisions. Nonetheless, they
do have a real economic interest in the outcome of the challenge because they
expended considerable time participating in the Revised SBZ Rulemaking,
they had a reasonable expectation that they would eventually operate
pursuant to the Revised SBZ Rule, and they made business planning choices
that reflected this expectation.' 4T lo neirt ofs ro n
vacate the final rule without any administrative process whatsoever would
undermine these interests, be materially unfair to the mining companies, and
result in significant disruptive consequences.
The district court in the SBZ Rule litigation only considered the mining
companies' interests in a general sense. The court agreed that accepting the
confession of error would allow Interior to circumvent Administrative
Procedure Act requirements. 66' But the court did not specifically evaluate the
extent to which the mining companies participated in the Revised SBZ
Rulemaking, nor did it consider the economic interests that the mining
companies had at stake in the litigation.16 6  Under the recommended
analytical framework, a court should have considered both of these factors.
C Public's Interest
The third step in the proposed analytical framework is to evaluate the
public's interest in the outcome of the agency's attempt to confess error.1
67
161. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text (citing the NMA as an intervenor
in the Revised SBZ Rule litigation).
162. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text (noting that the NMA has a stake
in the Revised SBZ Rule litigation).
163. See NMA Motion, supra note 48, at 5 (noting that no state has implemented the
Revised SBZ Rule).
164. See id. at 2-3 (describing the NMA's interest in the Revised SBZ Rule litigation).
165. See Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Salazar, 660 F. Supp. 2d 3, 5 (D.D.C. 2009)
("NMA has the better argument that granting the Federal defendants' motion would
wrongfully permit the Federal defendants to bypass established statutory procedures for
repealing an agency rule.").
166. See id. (omitting any discussion of these factors).
167. See supra Part IV.D (proposing an analytical framework for evaluating agency
confessions of error in which the court should evaluate the public's interest in the confession
of error).
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This evaluation should concentrate on all relevant factors, but in particular it
should focus on the risk that accepting or rejecting a confession of error will
deny the public a substantive right.
With respect to the SBZ Rule litigation, the public has a strong interest
in how Interior and OSM decide to regulate coal mining.168 It is true that
public opinion is split on the policy issues, but regardless of what form the
SBZ Rule ultimately takes, the public has a legitimate interest in being
allowed to participate in the rulemaking process pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act.'169  The general public availed itself of that
opportunity during the Revised SBZ Rulemaking,7 0 and to vacate that final
rule and substitute a new rule without any administrative process would
undermine the public's interest in participating, as guaranteed by statute. The
public's position on the relative merits of the two proposed rules may be
inconclusive, but in either case the public has a strong, legitimate interest in
being able to participate in the rulemaking. Accepting the confession of error
would deny them this opportunity.
The district court in the SBZ Rule litigation did not properly evaluate
the public's interest under the recommended analytical framework. In fact, it
did not consider the public's interest in the confession of error at all."7'
D. Judiciary's Interest
The fourth step in the proposed analytical framework is to evaluate the
judiciary's interest in the outcome of the agency's attempt to confess error.'1
72
This evaluation should principally focus on how accepting or rejecting the
confession of error will affect judicial resources. 1
7 1
168. See NAM Motion, supra note 48, at 2-4 (detailing the public's extensive
involvement in developing the Revised SBZ Rule).
169. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (describing the public's right to
participate in agency rulemakings pursuant the Administrative Procedure Act).
170. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing the public's involvement in
the Revised SBZ rulemaking).
171. See Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Salazar, 660 F. Supp. 2d 3,5 (D.D.C. 2009)
(omitting any discussion of the public's interest in the confession of error).
172. See supra Part IV.D (proposing an analytical framework for evaluating agency
confessions of error in which the court should evaluate the judiciary's interest in the
confession of error).
173. See id. (listing judicial resources as a primary factor in the analysis of confessions
of error).
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In the SBZ Rule litigation, allowing Interior to confess error would
save judicial resources by ending the instant litigation. However, allowing
confession of error might not save judicial resources in the long term
because the SBZ Rule is extremely controversial, and the parties who feel
aggrieved by the final rule are likely to institute additional legal
proceedings.
Moreover, accepting the confession of error might contribute to a
general trend of increased litigation in the future. For instance, allowing
this type of confession of error might encourage third parties-such as
environmentalists, industry groups, and labor unions-to liberally challenge
eleventh hour rules at times of presidential transition, with the hope that the
incoming administration would undo those rules by confessing error. A
proliferation of these lawsuits would strain judicial resources, and as
discussed throughout this Note, would raise grave concerns about the
political manipulation of agency confessions of error.
The district court in the SBZ Rule litigation did not properly evaluate
the judiciary's interest under the recommended analytical framework. As
with the public's interest, the court failed to consider the judiciary's interest
in its analysis.17 4
E. Balancing the Interests
The final step in the proposed analysis-after evaluating the respective
interests of all the affected parties-is to balance the interests against each
other to determine whether accepting the confession of error would be in
the best interests of justice."7 ' If on balance accepting the confession of
error would create an undue burden, result in a material unfairness, or
create significant disruptive consequences, then the court should refuse to
accept the confession of error. 1
76
.In the SBZ Rule litigation, the government had a legitimate interest in
confessing error to conserve its limited resources, but this was
counterbalanced by the risk that it had an illegitimate political motivation
for confessing error and that it was using the confession as a strategic tactic
174. See Nat '1 Parks Conservation Ass'n, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 3 (omitting any discussion
of the judiciary's interest in confessing error to conserve resources).
175. See supra Part IV.D (proposing an analytical framework for balancing the interests
of the relevant parties to determine whether to accept or refuse the confession of error).
176. See supra Part IV.D (listing various factors that should be considered when
evaluating confessions of error).
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to avoid an onerous procedural requirement. In turn, the mining companies
had a strong interest in resisting the confession of error because of their
participation in the rulemaking process and because of their economic
concerns. The public's specific view on the merits of the confession of
error are unknown, but in a general sense the public has a strong interest in
being allowed to participate in the rulemaking process, as guaranteed by the
Administrative Procedure Act. Accepting the confession of error would
have subverted this interest. Finally, the judiciary's interest in either
accepting or resisting the confession of error was inconclusive in the SBZ
Rule litigation. Accepting the confession of error might have saved judicial
resources by ending the instant litigation, but it also might have created
more litigation in the future, which would have required expenditure of
additional judicial resources. In the final analysis, the government's
interest in confessing error was strongly outweighed by the countervailing
risk of political abuse, the regulated party's interest in resisting the
confession of error, and the public's interest in participating in the
rulemaking process. Thus, the district court was correct to repudiate
Interior's attempt to confess error, but as this Note has argued, the district
court reached this conclusion without evaluating all the relevant factors.
VI. Conclusion
In the administrative agency context, confession of error is a poorly
studied phenomenon that carries significant political implications. These
political implications are particularly acute when an agency reorganizes its
leadership or changes its position on an issue of public policy. A
presidential transition provides the classic example of such a scenario.
As the SBZ Rule litigation demonstrated, an agency may use
confession of error as a strategic device to undo final regulations issued by
the previous presidential administration while avoiding lengthy
Administrative Procedure Act requirements. Because of this risk of
strategic manipulation, it is important that courts have a framework for
evaluating agency confessions of error so that they can determine whether
such confessions are appropriate. To this point, however, the federal courts
have failed to articulate any clear standards for reviewing agency
confessions of error, and in fact, with few exceptions, they have not
undertaken a close examination of the practice at all.
To remedy this problem, this Note recommends an analytical
framework that federal courts should use to review agency confessions of
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error. This framework will allow federal courts to separate legitimate uses
of the practice from illegitimate ones. Moreover, it ensures that the courts
will consider the interests of all relevant parties when they balance the
arguments weighing for and against accepting a confession of error. It is
my hope that this framework will prove useful in the future-not only in
times of presidential transition, but also in the myriad other scenarios in
which an agency may be eager to advance a political agenda by confessing
error.
